Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency

April 3,2014
International Crisis Group Africa report #216
www.crisisgroup.org.



Table of Contents 
 
 
Executive
Summary .............................................................................................................
...... i
Recommenda
tions................................................................................................................
..... iii
I.
Introduction ..................................................................................................................
... 1
II.
Corruption, Political Violence
and the Weak State .......................................................... 2
A.
Politics, Political Vi
olence, Bad Governance
and Poverty ......................................... 2
B.
Declining Human
Development Resources ............................................................... 4
C.
Growing Alienation and
Radicalisation ..................................................................... 5
III.
The Rise of Bo
ko Haram .................................................................................................. 7
A.
The Muslim Battle of Id
eas in the North ................................................................... 8
B.
The Emergence and Evolutio
n of Boko
Haram ......................................................... 9
1.
Internal disagr
eements ........................................................................................ 9
2.
A dangerous politi
cal tool ..................................................................................... 11
3.
The uprisi
ng .......................................................................................................... 13
IV.
A Rapidly Evolving
Threat ............................................................................................... 14
A.
Revenge, Changing Tactics an
d Terrorist Vi
olence ................................................... 14
B.
Diffuse Organisation
and Leadersh
ip ........................................................................ 18
C.
External Links an
d Networks .................................................................................... 23
D.
From Boko Haram to
Ansaru
.................................................................................... 26
V.
A Complex Co
nflict ...........................................................................................................
30
A.
The Government’s
Response ..................................................................................... 30
1.
Strengthening anti-terro
rism legislation ............................................................. 30
2.
Boosting the capacities of
the military and other
security agencies. ................... 31
3.
Exploring dialogue with
the insurg
ents ............................................................... 33
4.
Military operations and ci
vilian vigila
ntes ........................................................... 34
5.
Contradictory strategi
es and fr
aud ...................................................................... 36
B.
Boko Haram’s Suspicio
n and Divisio
ns ..................................................................... 37
C.
The Civilian Joint
Task Force .................................................................................... 38
D.
The 2015 Elec
tions ..................................................................................................... 39
E.
Impact on the North and Impl
ications for
Nigeria
................................................... 40
VI.
A Way Forward .................................................................................................................
42
A.
Federal Govern
ment .................................................................................................. 42
1.
A far north developm
ent commiss
ion .................................................................. 42
2.
Improved governance and
service deli
very .......................................................... 43
3.
An end to im
punity ............................................................................................... 43
4.
Win hearts an
d minds .......................................................................................... 43
B.
Nigeria’s Part
ners ...................................................................................................... 45
1.
Regional part
ners ................................................................................................. 45
2.
Other partners an
d donors ................................................................................... 46
C.
Addressing Extr
emism .............................................................................................. 47
D.
Local and National
Dialogue ..................................................................................... 47
VII.
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................
.... 49


For more info:  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf.

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