28 March 2014
Furkan Torlak
Source: Middle East Monitor
In the past week, the Washington-based Bipartisan Policy Center
published a report titled, "Turkey's Local Election: Actors, Factors,
and Implications" signed by Alan Makosky, Eric Edelman and Morton
Abramowitz, all known for their poor judgment of Turkey's
democratization process.
The report conducted an analysis of Turkey's upcoming local elections
through reading basic conflict parameters and tried to explain the
elections to American policymakers. The report set forth the following
hypothesis: Between 2003 and 2010, the main division dominating Turkish
politics was the struggle between the secular and conservative segments
of the society. The conservative wing was represented by the Gülen
Movement and the AK Party, both based along the lines of the National
Vision Movement (MGH) founded by Necmettin Erbakan. The secular strata
lost following the 2010 referendum, starting a brand new course in
Turkish politics.
According to the report, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not
fulfill his democratization promises and chose the path of
authoritarianism instead. Tensions escalated as a direct result of his
ambitions and transformed into a conflict between the Gülen Movement and
the government. The local elections came along in this atmosphere and
are thought to be the first response to the political turbulence that
Turkey entered. The report declares Erdoğan will become more rigid
following the local elections and will increase oversight over the
system in an effort to protect his dominance.
In a strange kind of way, the report says the only way election
results will be considered significant is if the AK Party loses. As it
is clearly evident, the report is not patient inasmuch as waiting for
the elections. With an explicit bias, the report argues that Erdoğan has
become a burden on the conservative Islamic segment of the population.
Primarily, one of the remarkable aspects of the report is that it
establishes the Gülen Movement as the main actor, that started the probe
on Dec. 17 and revealed the corruption allegations "in accordance with
procedures." This depiction on its own seems to verify the existence of a
parallel structure within state institutions from an external viewpoint
regardless of how "poor" the judgment may be.
However, the report's depiction of the existing political conflict is
considerably far from reality. Reducing the struggle that occurred in
Turkey between 2003 and 2010 to a conflict between the secularists and
conservatives is an allegation that is difficult to defend. In fact, the
conflict that took place was a struggle on a much larger scale against
the Old Turkey's tutelage regime by a wide segment of conservatives
acting in accord with reformist lines toward a New Turkey, along with
the block comprised of liberals and Kurdish politicians previously
marginalized by the state.
Yes, with the 2010 referendum Turkey reached a juncture whereby the
tutelage regime unique to Old Turkey would be left behind. The
historical juncture began with a new Constitution and brought into
action the reconciliation process as a peace project to resolve the
Kurdish issue. It would also bring into action the democratization
packages in order to provide cohesion between the state and the nation.
The prospect of these expectations increased with the AK Party's
decisive victory in the 2011 general elections.
As a matter of fact, the AK Party took initiative to create a new
Constitution. Despite having a majority in Parliament, the party adopted
an approach that emphasized "reconciliation" and led the establishment
of a constitutional commission where all parties would be represented
equally. After long discussions, the AK Party proposed the approval of
articles reaching an agreement in Parliament. It announced and
promulgated the democratization package. Many of the steps that were
taken by the party indicated Erdoğan did not diverge from the final
destination of democratization.
However, during this new course, the Gülen Movement started to
falter. The movement first made a u-turn with regard to the solution of
the Kurdish issue, a task taken upon by Prime Minister Erdoğan, who
undertook political risks. The movement tried to sabotage the process
with the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) case. The ensuing National
Intelligence Agency (MİT) crisis was interpreted as an attempt to hinder
the reconciliation process and aimed to sending a warning message to
Erdoğan, rather than a personal settlement with [MİT chief] Hakan Fidan,
whom they have known since his position as president of TİKA [Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency].
The Gülen Movement also turned a blind eye to the AK Party's efforts
regarding constitutional reforms and disdained the democratization
packages. It attempted to manipulate through the use of a parallel
structure within state institutions granting them significant control.
The movement could not break away from the characteristics of the Old
Turkey and became a pos- sessor of those characteristics in attempting
to shape the new Constitution, determine the fate of politics and be-
come a tutelage candidate.
These details stand out, especially when one goes beyond a
neoconservative interpretation of the developments in Turkey. Without
going beyond this analysis, it is not be possible to understand the
reason why the movement did not receive support from conservative
circles throughout the conflict with the government or the suspicions of
the secular circles and the detached approach to Kurdish politics. So
much so that during this process, even other branches of the Nur
Movement - from which the Gülen Movement originated - took an opposing
stance toward the movement!
The current state of affairs indicates the struggle has become one
that brought the government and the movement against each other rather
than the prime minister's personal efforts to protect his power. This is
clearly evident by the fact that different segments of the society
within the bureaucracy have explicitly expressed their support for the
prime minister and the government through a notion of protecting the
state. A senior bureaucrat who does not identify himself as an AK Party
supporter said: "The prime minister of the Turkish Republic can only
come to power through elections and leave through elections. All
attempts apart from this will find themselves facing the state."
Accordingly, interpreting the current situation as the prime
minister's attempts to increase his control over the system as claimed
by the report does not seem realistic. In actuality, the current process
is one of normalization within different ranks of state institutions
and the bureaucracy.
In other words, this is a period to terminate the tutelage of a
minority over state institutions, because reform in the bureaucracy is
moving toward a resettlement inclusive of National Vision, Islamist, Nur
Movement, nationalist, social democrat, liberal, left-wing and Alevi
circles. Perhaps the current tensions are steps on the way to the New
Turkey.
Bipartisan Policy Center report
On March 14, 2014, the Bipartisan Policy Center published a report
titled, "Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors and Implications."
The Washington-based think tank previously published reports on Turkey.
This particular report was compiled by Morton Abramowitz and Eric
Edelman, former ambassadors of the United States to Turkey. The report
mainly claims that the current political situation in Turkey is "highly
worrisome" for American interests as the authors claim the country is
becoming less reliable and stable, going as far as comparing it to Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan simply based on the notion that these countries
share Islamic values. The authors disregard the radically different
political cultures and economic and social situation in these countries,
reducing the judgment to a monolithic rhetoric. Bipartisan Policy
Center describes itself as a think tank which "drives principled
solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful
dialogue" charac- terized by "politically balanced policy making with
strong, proactive advocacy and outreach." The Center was founded in 2007
by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole
and George J. Mitchell.
This article was first published by Daily Sabah
Link: www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/10584-understanding-the-conflict-between-the-gulen-movement-and-the-turkish-government.
