18 August 2012
By Orla Guerin
Source:BBC News Magazine
With Syrian forces focused on the fighting in the big cities, Kurdish leaders say they now control half of their region in the north-east. Travelling undercover, the BBC's Orla Guerin found many already looking forward to autonomy in a democratic Syria.
With gold-rimmed glasses, a neat black moustache and a pinstripe shirt, the middle-aged man who came to meet us could have been a bank manager.
He was unmarried, he explained, and had no children. He wanted us to know that was a choice, not a twist of fate.
"As a Kurd I am not free," he said. "I couldn't father a child who was also a prisoner."
Instead of becoming a husband and a father, he became a guerrilla fighter, and an activist.
Continue reading the main story
“Start Quote
We Kurds are in charge here. We'll have no problems.”
Amer Syrian Kurd in Qamishli
He has spent 15 years fighting for self-rule for the Kurds. These days he feels it is getting a lot closer.
In parts of Syria's Kurdish north-east, that is how it seems.
Under a hot sun, we travelled through dusty villages and towns, passing hillsides where shepherds still tend their flocks.
And we found something missing - the dark shadow of the security forces.
After a wave of protests in late July, President Bashar al-Assad loosened his grip on the Kurdish region, probably so that he could try to tighten it elsewhere.
Kurdish leaders say they now control about half their territory. Kurdish flags have replaced Syrian ones. Kurdish language schools have opened.
And though the government's security forces are not gone completely, they are lying low.
Over glasses of tamarind juice in the city of Qamishli, a former law student turned politician summed it up. "These days," said Amer, sitting cross-legged on the carpet, "the police wouldn't show up even if someone was killed."
On our undercover journey through the region, bumping into the Syrian military was not part of our plan.
But we had a telling close encounter as we filmed outside a courthouse. Our local guide had assured us it was safe.
"We Kurds are in charge here," he said. "We'll have no problems."
Then a young Syrian soldier emerged from inside. In a vest, and sandals, he was not dressed for combat. He stood in silence, looking a bit scared of us.
A moment later a plain-clothes Syrian official strode into view - the type of man who could have detained us or dispatched us to Damascus. But he was more interested in hurrying us away.
Schools teaching the Kurdish language have opened across in north-east Syria
Travel among the Kurds and you get enmeshed in a web of hospitality. It seems every door is open, every hand is outstretched.
And over plates of figs and grapes, and cups of cardamom-flavoured coffee, every family has a story of suffering to tell.
In the home of Said Hameh, we sat in a circle on the floor, in the Kurdish way. "Just to gather here like this would have been impossible a month ago," he said. "We couldn't dare talk to a journalist."
Recalling how the regime had fired him from his teaching job, Said beat the patterned rug in frustration with his fist.
He and many others want the government erased from the region altogether.
"They are not killing us," he said "but we are not completely free. Freedom means more than just existence. If I go somewhere, I could still be arrested."
The Kurds insist they want peaceful change, but they are ready for a fight if it comes to it. District by district, they have been setting up armed self-defence units. And a militia has sprung up, though it is media-shy.
"Those guys are everywhere, but they are not under our control," said Saleh Mohamed, the softly spoken leader of the Kurdish Democratic Union - the most powerful party here.
He also denies having operational links to the guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK, who have been fighting for self-rule across the border in Turkey for decades.
Mohamed is a veteran of the struggle for Kurdish rights, with the CV to prove it.
I asked how long he had spent in prison. "Not long," he said, with a laugh.
"Just two or three months a year - every year - since 2003. And it was the Middle East-type of prison with the underground rooms for torture."
Mohamed talked about the past and the future of his ancient people with an unhurried air. "I believe our struggle is beginning to have results," he said, voicing a feeling shared by many Kurds.
It is unclear what will emerge from the broken jigsaw of Syria but the Kurds are already benefiting from the chaos. They are pushing for autonomy in a new Syria.
But ultimately many yearn for Greater Kurdistan - an independent state for all the Kurds.
Showing posts with label Israeli criminal activities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israeli criminal activities. Show all posts
Saturday, August 18, 2012
Turkey: A Baffling 24 Hours
August 9, 2012
by Claire Berlinski
Source: Gatestone Institute
I confess freely that I'm finding it difficult to make sense of recent events in Turkey, and I submit that anyone offering a confident analysis is exaggerating either his access or his analytic acumen. There is obviously a great deal happening; but the people who understand it aren't talking, and the people who are talking don't understand it.
Here is what we do know: This morning, there was a terrorist attack in Izmir that claimed the life of a Turkish soldier and injured eleven more. A remotely-controlled land mine exploded as a military bus was passing on a road in the Aegean town of Foça. The attack is believed to be the work of the PKK, and has many of the PKK's signature hallmarks. To judge from reports on Twitter, Izmir citizens were--predictably--appalled, enraged and terrified.
The location of the attack was significant. Izmir is in Western Turkey, and while PKK attacks are not unknown here, they are not common. Civilians were targeted by bombs in Kuşadası and Çeşme in 2005, and in Güngören, in Istanbul 2008--although the authorship of the latter bombing is unclear. In 2010, a bomb targeting police forces exploded in Istanbul's Taksim Square (it is impossible to set off a bomb in Taksim Square without endangering civilian lives, so in no way can this be considered a purely military target, and given that Turkey's army is a conscript army, I am not sure this distinction is in any case meaningful.) Last year saw a deadly bombing in Çankaya, Ankara, and a bizarre, but mercifully thwarted, attack on an Izmit ferry. But the PKK assumed responsibility for neither--the former was assumed to be the work of a PKK splinter group, the latter, a lunatic.
So why Izmir, and why now? It is hard to believe that Istanbul is better protected than Izmir; Istanbul would have been the more spectacular target were the aim to show, "We can hit you anywhere." Some speculate that it is because Izmir swings to the right on the issue of negotiations with the PKK to a much greater degree than those in Istanbul. Izmir is also an opposition CHP stronghold--but whether this is significant I don't know.
Meanwhile, there is something close to a news blackout about the battle of Şemdinli, in the Southeast. Some reports are trickling out, and while I don't know what to make of them, I am certain the news isn't good:
As intense fighting between government forces and militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continue unabated in the southeastern province of Hakkari, Bianet reporter Nilay Vardar has travelled to the heart of the conflict zone to relate the developments there which mainstream media has given only superficial coverage to. ...
The moment we stepped into downtown Şemdinli, everyone began pointing toward the plumes of smoke rising from Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar as if to say "Look, they do not believe us."
Everyone was anxious to tell me their stories because there were virtually no journalists from the mainstream media in town. İdris Emen from the daily Radikal had been there for three days, not to mention the local reporters who could not get their voices heard.
They kept asking why no journalists had come, and thus everyone was in a hurry to get their stories across just as a journalist had arrived from Istanbul.
Locals were so inured to clashes in the area for 35 years that the sounds of constant artillery fire and low flying helicopter gunships were no strangers to them. The only difference was that this was the first time around that a battle had lasted for so long.
Yesterday, the same reporter, Nilay Vardir, observed that
[t]he clashes are raging over an area 600 square kilometers wide, including Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar across the district center.
Over 500 villagers were forced to evacuate their homes in the days that followed the eruption of the conflict.
The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) has run "identity checks" on many village roads, and even on the road to Yüksekova. The "identity cheks," which are cited as the main reason that ignited the conflict, are a means for the PKK to assert its presence, according to what I have heard.
"Hit and run" turns to "hit and stay?"
BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) [My note: the party is something like Sein Fein to the PKK's IRA] Deputy Esad Canan who accompanied us in our car during our trip from Yüksekova to Şemdinli said the PKK had revised its tactic from "hit and run" to "hit and stay," allowing it to establish "area control" in Şemdinli.
Canan also said the officials' muted response to the issue was due to the state's loss of control in the area.
"We [were not allowed to] enter through the borders of our district with the mayor, and this shows the state is hiding something," he said in regards to their aborted attempt to enter a neighborhood in downtown Şemdinli.
The clashes are raging over an area 600 square kilometers wide, including Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar across the district center.
Over 500 villagers were forced to evacuate their homes in the days that followed the eruption of the conflict.
The ongoing clashes are the most protracted ever, he also added.
"We are just like back in the 1990s. There is a de facto 'OHAL' (state of emergency)," Canan said.
Deputy Canan also elucidated on the reasons as to why the conflict had broken out now and why in Şemdinli in particular:
"Şemdinli is where the PKK launched its first raid in 1984 in tandem with Eruh; it bears symbolic significance. Secondly, it [represents] a reaction against the state's claim to have finished the PKK off and Prime Minister Erdoğan's rhetoric of intervention against the formation of a Kurdish [entity] in Syria," Canan said.
"The PKK is telling the state to pay attention to Şemdinli rather than picking on Syria," former Hakkari Deputy Hamit Geylani also explained, as he kept us company at an "iftar" meal where we dined together with all the other reporters in the district.
No explanations, merely allegations
The question of exactly how many troops and PKK members lost their lives in the conflict is still shrouded in mystery. Reports indicate that 10 soldiers died until now, including in the attack in downtown Hakkari. There is talk of bodybags being picked up from hospitals.
Further claims are also abound that the troops who died were mercenaries and that the Turkish Armed Forces had mistakenly killed 17 soldiers. All this is nothing but hearsay, however, as authorities have barred all access into the region.
The PKK announced that it had lost four guerillas. Families keep arriving in Şemdinli to pick their funerals up, but officials deny them access into the area for reasons of security.
As freelance journalist Frederike Geerdink noted on August 3,
'A new tactic', says Murat Karayilan, commander of the Kurdish armed movement, the PKK, via a Kurdish news agency. No, says the Turkish army, it's a big anti PKK operation. Fact is that in the South-east of Turkey an unusually long battle is being fought between the army and the PKK. The fighting has been going on now for eleven days.
Usually [such] confrontations are short: the PKK attacks an army post or police station or explodes a mine, after which they quickly go back into hiding. The army, in its turn, bombs PKK camps in the mountains on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Battles that last for days, like now in the Şemdinli region, are unusual.
Whether the PKK, like Karayilan says, has really changed tactics, must nevertheless be doubted, says analyst Gareth Jenkins. He works in Istanbul for the American Institute for Central Asia and the Caucasus. Jenkins: 'The PKK can't really hold territory; they don't have the military means for that'.
But that it is a one-sided, long lasting attack on the PKK, like the army says, isn't very convincing either: the military's power is so much greater that such an operation shouldn't have to last eleven days.
The fighting started when eleven days ago the PKK put up roadblocks in the area, stopped cars and checked people's identities. That triggered the army action. Jenkins: 'I think the PKK changed tactics already about a year ago. Then Kurdish groups declared so-called 'democratic autonomy', and ever since the PKK wants to show they ultimately call the shots in the area.'
The recent PKK bombing of the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline, on July 30, suggests another dimension of the conflict: The explosion not only interrupted Iraqi oil transfers, but suggested that the PKK remains willing to target Turkey's strategic assets, integrally tied to its energy infrastructure.
Yesterday, the Turkish interior minister, İdris Naim Şahin, claimed that half of the PKK terrorists killed in the southeast were carrying Iranian, Iraqi, Armenian and Israeli identification. The day before, the same minister claimed that there was "no difference" between a terrorist who employed mortars and bullets in Geçimli and one who "writes articles in Ankara"--a comment that suggests the dismal effect this conflict, if unabated, will have on prospects for democratization and freedom of expression in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan today agreed, suggesting that those responsible for the escalation of violence were--of course--the press. ""Know that every sentence you write about [the terrorists]," he said,"is the element of propaganda they are looking for but can not find. And know that we keep track of that." What precisely this means is unclear, but it is surely connected to the lack of reporting we're receiving from the Southeast. It is no small irony that it is now possible for those of us living in Istanbul to receive more news from Mars than from Hakkari.
While obviously it is absurd to suggest that the PKK is comprised of Armenians and Israelis, the idea that Assad is providing assistance to them isn't--on the face on it--at all implausible. It seems to me unlikely that Iran is actively assisting them; they've got enough problems of their own with the PJAK that I can't imagine they'd want to stir up that hornet's nest--but who knows. Now, I stress that I am speculating here, but it does seem obvious that were I Assad, I'd want the Turkish military and the Turkish intelligence services completely tied down with its own domestic uprising; and I'd hope to foment as much public backlash in Turkey against the AKP's foreign meddling as possible.
That said, from various credible reports it sounds as if Assad's forces are so confused at this point that they're hard-pressed to find their own backsides with both hands. I have heard from journalists I trust that Assad's forces are bombing and strafing at random while missing obvious targets such as the FSA headquarters. This does not sound to me like a regime in a position to pull off a complicated act of internal subversion in Turkey. But again, I stress, I am speculating, based on very limited real knowledge--as is almost everyone with an opinion about this region.
Meanwhile, Turkey's rapprochement with Iran is all but officially over. This morning, Iran announced that it had suspended arrangements for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens. (As one Turkish journalist remarked on Twitter, "Break up is official: Iran suspends visa privileges for Turks. Will officials exchange letters and gifts?" "Americans," I replied, "feel like the previous girlfriend who tried to warn Turkey, but everyone dismissed her as 'just bitter.'" This got a few laughs, but I suspect it also captures the truth just a bit too well for comfort.)
Two days ago, on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's website, Iranian Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi warned Turkey that "it will be its turn" if it continued to "help advance the warmongering policies of the United States in Syria." It would not, Firouzabadi said, be "an appropriate precedent, that neighboring countries of Syria contribute to the belligerent purposes of the Great Satan, the United States. If these countries have accepted such a precedent, they must be aware that after Syria, it will be the turn of Turkey and other countries."
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu was clearly not best pleased by these comments. "There are disagreements between Turkey and Iran over the Syrian crisis for which the Syrian regime bears the whole responsibility," he replied. "It is our right to expect Iran to assume a constructive attitude in the face of the blood of Muslims spilled in Syria in the holy month of Ramadan. Blaming Turkey or other countries would produce no positive result ... and I have made perfectly clear to Salehi that Iranian officials should seriously filter their statements before making them."
Rumors here are circulating that Davutoğlu is in bad odor in Ankara, his foreign policy vision having failed to deliver upon so much as a single one of its rosy promises. It is not clear how seriously these rumors should be taken: I for one cannot remember the resignation of a high-level Turkish politician over anything short of a leaked sex tape; political failure appears no obstacle to political advancement in Turkey. That said, immediately following his warning to Salehi, Davutoğlu departed with unusual haste to Myanmar to address the plight of the long-suffering Rohingya Muslims. Given that Davutoğlu's immediate neighborhood--and at least seven districts of his homeland--are in flames, this does seem an odd place for him to be. It isn't unusual in Turkey for attention to be diverted from domestic discontents by some spectacular display of humanitarian interest in a far-away, long suffering Muslim people (the last time, it was Somalia), but this is particularly bizarre. So who knows what machinations are playing out in Ankara.
by Claire Berlinski
Source: Gatestone Institute
I confess freely that I'm finding it difficult to make sense of recent events in Turkey, and I submit that anyone offering a confident analysis is exaggerating either his access or his analytic acumen. There is obviously a great deal happening; but the people who understand it aren't talking, and the people who are talking don't understand it.
Here is what we do know: This morning, there was a terrorist attack in Izmir that claimed the life of a Turkish soldier and injured eleven more. A remotely-controlled land mine exploded as a military bus was passing on a road in the Aegean town of Foça. The attack is believed to be the work of the PKK, and has many of the PKK's signature hallmarks. To judge from reports on Twitter, Izmir citizens were--predictably--appalled, enraged and terrified.
The location of the attack was significant. Izmir is in Western Turkey, and while PKK attacks are not unknown here, they are not common. Civilians were targeted by bombs in Kuşadası and Çeşme in 2005, and in Güngören, in Istanbul 2008--although the authorship of the latter bombing is unclear. In 2010, a bomb targeting police forces exploded in Istanbul's Taksim Square (it is impossible to set off a bomb in Taksim Square without endangering civilian lives, so in no way can this be considered a purely military target, and given that Turkey's army is a conscript army, I am not sure this distinction is in any case meaningful.) Last year saw a deadly bombing in Çankaya, Ankara, and a bizarre, but mercifully thwarted, attack on an Izmit ferry. But the PKK assumed responsibility for neither--the former was assumed to be the work of a PKK splinter group, the latter, a lunatic.
So why Izmir, and why now? It is hard to believe that Istanbul is better protected than Izmir; Istanbul would have been the more spectacular target were the aim to show, "We can hit you anywhere." Some speculate that it is because Izmir swings to the right on the issue of negotiations with the PKK to a much greater degree than those in Istanbul. Izmir is also an opposition CHP stronghold--but whether this is significant I don't know.
Meanwhile, there is something close to a news blackout about the battle of Şemdinli, in the Southeast. Some reports are trickling out, and while I don't know what to make of them, I am certain the news isn't good:
As intense fighting between government forces and militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continue unabated in the southeastern province of Hakkari, Bianet reporter Nilay Vardar has travelled to the heart of the conflict zone to relate the developments there which mainstream media has given only superficial coverage to. ...
The moment we stepped into downtown Şemdinli, everyone began pointing toward the plumes of smoke rising from Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar as if to say "Look, they do not believe us."
Everyone was anxious to tell me their stories because there were virtually no journalists from the mainstream media in town. İdris Emen from the daily Radikal had been there for three days, not to mention the local reporters who could not get their voices heard.
They kept asking why no journalists had come, and thus everyone was in a hurry to get their stories across just as a journalist had arrived from Istanbul.
Locals were so inured to clashes in the area for 35 years that the sounds of constant artillery fire and low flying helicopter gunships were no strangers to them. The only difference was that this was the first time around that a battle had lasted for so long.
Yesterday, the same reporter, Nilay Vardir, observed that
[t]he clashes are raging over an area 600 square kilometers wide, including Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar across the district center.
Over 500 villagers were forced to evacuate their homes in the days that followed the eruption of the conflict.
The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) has run "identity checks" on many village roads, and even on the road to Yüksekova. The "identity cheks," which are cited as the main reason that ignited the conflict, are a means for the PKK to assert its presence, according to what I have heard.
"Hit and run" turns to "hit and stay?"
BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) [My note: the party is something like Sein Fein to the PKK's IRA] Deputy Esad Canan who accompanied us in our car during our trip from Yüksekova to Şemdinli said the PKK had revised its tactic from "hit and run" to "hit and stay," allowing it to establish "area control" in Şemdinli.
Canan also said the officials' muted response to the issue was due to the state's loss of control in the area.
"We [were not allowed to] enter through the borders of our district with the mayor, and this shows the state is hiding something," he said in regards to their aborted attempt to enter a neighborhood in downtown Şemdinli.
The clashes are raging over an area 600 square kilometers wide, including Mt. Goman and Mt. Efkar across the district center.
Over 500 villagers were forced to evacuate their homes in the days that followed the eruption of the conflict.
The ongoing clashes are the most protracted ever, he also added.
"We are just like back in the 1990s. There is a de facto 'OHAL' (state of emergency)," Canan said.
Deputy Canan also elucidated on the reasons as to why the conflict had broken out now and why in Şemdinli in particular:
"Şemdinli is where the PKK launched its first raid in 1984 in tandem with Eruh; it bears symbolic significance. Secondly, it [represents] a reaction against the state's claim to have finished the PKK off and Prime Minister Erdoğan's rhetoric of intervention against the formation of a Kurdish [entity] in Syria," Canan said.
"The PKK is telling the state to pay attention to Şemdinli rather than picking on Syria," former Hakkari Deputy Hamit Geylani also explained, as he kept us company at an "iftar" meal where we dined together with all the other reporters in the district.
No explanations, merely allegations
The question of exactly how many troops and PKK members lost their lives in the conflict is still shrouded in mystery. Reports indicate that 10 soldiers died until now, including in the attack in downtown Hakkari. There is talk of bodybags being picked up from hospitals.
Further claims are also abound that the troops who died were mercenaries and that the Turkish Armed Forces had mistakenly killed 17 soldiers. All this is nothing but hearsay, however, as authorities have barred all access into the region.
The PKK announced that it had lost four guerillas. Families keep arriving in Şemdinli to pick their funerals up, but officials deny them access into the area for reasons of security.
As freelance journalist Frederike Geerdink noted on August 3,
'A new tactic', says Murat Karayilan, commander of the Kurdish armed movement, the PKK, via a Kurdish news agency. No, says the Turkish army, it's a big anti PKK operation. Fact is that in the South-east of Turkey an unusually long battle is being fought between the army and the PKK. The fighting has been going on now for eleven days.
Usually [such] confrontations are short: the PKK attacks an army post or police station or explodes a mine, after which they quickly go back into hiding. The army, in its turn, bombs PKK camps in the mountains on the Turkish-Iraqi border. Battles that last for days, like now in the Şemdinli region, are unusual.
Whether the PKK, like Karayilan says, has really changed tactics, must nevertheless be doubted, says analyst Gareth Jenkins. He works in Istanbul for the American Institute for Central Asia and the Caucasus. Jenkins: 'The PKK can't really hold territory; they don't have the military means for that'.
But that it is a one-sided, long lasting attack on the PKK, like the army says, isn't very convincing either: the military's power is so much greater that such an operation shouldn't have to last eleven days.
The fighting started when eleven days ago the PKK put up roadblocks in the area, stopped cars and checked people's identities. That triggered the army action. Jenkins: 'I think the PKK changed tactics already about a year ago. Then Kurdish groups declared so-called 'democratic autonomy', and ever since the PKK wants to show they ultimately call the shots in the area.'
The recent PKK bombing of the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline, on July 30, suggests another dimension of the conflict: The explosion not only interrupted Iraqi oil transfers, but suggested that the PKK remains willing to target Turkey's strategic assets, integrally tied to its energy infrastructure.
Yesterday, the Turkish interior minister, İdris Naim Şahin, claimed that half of the PKK terrorists killed in the southeast were carrying Iranian, Iraqi, Armenian and Israeli identification. The day before, the same minister claimed that there was "no difference" between a terrorist who employed mortars and bullets in Geçimli and one who "writes articles in Ankara"--a comment that suggests the dismal effect this conflict, if unabated, will have on prospects for democratization and freedom of expression in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan today agreed, suggesting that those responsible for the escalation of violence were--of course--the press. ""Know that every sentence you write about [the terrorists]," he said,"is the element of propaganda they are looking for but can not find. And know that we keep track of that." What precisely this means is unclear, but it is surely connected to the lack of reporting we're receiving from the Southeast. It is no small irony that it is now possible for those of us living in Istanbul to receive more news from Mars than from Hakkari.
While obviously it is absurd to suggest that the PKK is comprised of Armenians and Israelis, the idea that Assad is providing assistance to them isn't--on the face on it--at all implausible. It seems to me unlikely that Iran is actively assisting them; they've got enough problems of their own with the PJAK that I can't imagine they'd want to stir up that hornet's nest--but who knows. Now, I stress that I am speculating here, but it does seem obvious that were I Assad, I'd want the Turkish military and the Turkish intelligence services completely tied down with its own domestic uprising; and I'd hope to foment as much public backlash in Turkey against the AKP's foreign meddling as possible.
That said, from various credible reports it sounds as if Assad's forces are so confused at this point that they're hard-pressed to find their own backsides with both hands. I have heard from journalists I trust that Assad's forces are bombing and strafing at random while missing obvious targets such as the FSA headquarters. This does not sound to me like a regime in a position to pull off a complicated act of internal subversion in Turkey. But again, I stress, I am speculating, based on very limited real knowledge--as is almost everyone with an opinion about this region.
Meanwhile, Turkey's rapprochement with Iran is all but officially over. This morning, Iran announced that it had suspended arrangements for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens. (As one Turkish journalist remarked on Twitter, "Break up is official: Iran suspends visa privileges for Turks. Will officials exchange letters and gifts?" "Americans," I replied, "feel like the previous girlfriend who tried to warn Turkey, but everyone dismissed her as 'just bitter.'" This got a few laughs, but I suspect it also captures the truth just a bit too well for comfort.)
Two days ago, on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's website, Iranian Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi warned Turkey that "it will be its turn" if it continued to "help advance the warmongering policies of the United States in Syria." It would not, Firouzabadi said, be "an appropriate precedent, that neighboring countries of Syria contribute to the belligerent purposes of the Great Satan, the United States. If these countries have accepted such a precedent, they must be aware that after Syria, it will be the turn of Turkey and other countries."
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu was clearly not best pleased by these comments. "There are disagreements between Turkey and Iran over the Syrian crisis for which the Syrian regime bears the whole responsibility," he replied. "It is our right to expect Iran to assume a constructive attitude in the face of the blood of Muslims spilled in Syria in the holy month of Ramadan. Blaming Turkey or other countries would produce no positive result ... and I have made perfectly clear to Salehi that Iranian officials should seriously filter their statements before making them."
Rumors here are circulating that Davutoğlu is in bad odor in Ankara, his foreign policy vision having failed to deliver upon so much as a single one of its rosy promises. It is not clear how seriously these rumors should be taken: I for one cannot remember the resignation of a high-level Turkish politician over anything short of a leaked sex tape; political failure appears no obstacle to political advancement in Turkey. That said, immediately following his warning to Salehi, Davutoğlu departed with unusual haste to Myanmar to address the plight of the long-suffering Rohingya Muslims. Given that Davutoğlu's immediate neighborhood--and at least seven districts of his homeland--are in flames, this does seem an odd place for him to be. It isn't unusual in Turkey for attention to be diverted from domestic discontents by some spectacular display of humanitarian interest in a far-away, long suffering Muslim people (the last time, it was Somalia), but this is particularly bizarre. So who knows what machinations are playing out in Ankara.
Israeli gas, Iranian Missles, and the Russian Price Tag
Aug 17, 2012
by Rotem Sella
Source: Gatestone Institute
In the on-going debate over an Israeli attack on Iran, attention has largely focused over the last few weeks on Israel and America, for good reason. But what about Russia?
A very senior person in the Israeli gas industry tells me: "The Russians have been poking around here for a while. Everyone knows about the Russian interest in controlling the European energy market. Do they want to buy from us, or delay our efforts? I don't know. But they are here."
In early July, the Israeli energy and infrastructure news website "Thastiot" claimed that during Vladimir Putin's much publicized visit to Israel, Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to form a junior company to Gazprom – the Russian oil and gas giant—which would help develop Israel's biggest gas field, the recently discovered reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, the so-called "Levyatan" (Leviathan) reserves.
"Eventually Israeli gas will be exported to the far east," Ohad Marani, CEO of IDLC energy which is already drilling the Myra, said to me. For him, the question is purely economic. "In the Far East we will see three times what we see in Europe. While we won't be able to keep the whole margin, it's surely better than any European option, which would involve an expensive pipe."
The senior industry veteran with whom I spoke is not quite sure. Yes, the Far East has unlimited demand ("The Japanese are lessening their reliance on nuclear, and the Chinese can never have enough") but the European market remains relevant and we have this massive amount of gas already discovered or to be discovered. The US geological survey (USGC) estimates that gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean amount to 345 trillion cubic feet while Russian gas reserves in Siberia are estimated at 643 tcf.
Big business! With lots of Russians having come and gone to Israel on this question, one wonders about the relationship between the gas deal and Russian involvement on the Iran question.
The same week Putin visited Netanyahu in Jerusalem, Eurasia monitor published that:
"the government agency that oversees Russia's arms exports and imports… confirmed that Iran is suing Russia for damages to the tune of some $4 billion in the Court of Arbitration in Geneva for cancelling in 2010 a contract to sell five divisions of the S-300 long-range antiaircraft missile system worth an estimated $800 million to $1 billion."
By some estimates the worth of the Levayatan gas-field might be 15 billion dollars say Gilad Alper, the gas industry analyst at the Excellence Investment house. It trades today at a price of 3 billion dollars.
Another way to look at it: Levayatan contains 473 billion cubic meters of gas. Gazprom exported 150 billion cubic meters of Gas to Europe in 2011, at a price of 384$ per thousand cubic meters – revenue of 57.6 billion dollar—this year Gazprom raised the price to 415$, an 8% increase that will generate another 4.6 billion dollar of revenue to Gazprom. What would be the cost of keeping Israeli competition neutralized? Would it be worth the cancellation of an 800 million dollar deal? Could Russian action over the missile sale and Israeli gas reserves indicate that they have come to terms with the Israeli point of view?
Prominent Americans like David Petraeus have been saying non-stop that Israel does not have the capability to destroy Iranian Nuclear capacities, and surely not Iran's ambition to go nuclear. But if Israel can indeed delay the project while in the meantime having taken out of the picture one of Iran's most important allies, then things might look very different from the office of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Everyone knows that Russia intends to play the 'spoiler' in the International arena. But this spoiler frequently has a price tag.
by Rotem Sella
Source: Gatestone Institute
In the on-going debate over an Israeli attack on Iran, attention has largely focused over the last few weeks on Israel and America, for good reason. But what about Russia?
A very senior person in the Israeli gas industry tells me: "The Russians have been poking around here for a while. Everyone knows about the Russian interest in controlling the European energy market. Do they want to buy from us, or delay our efforts? I don't know. But they are here."
In early July, the Israeli energy and infrastructure news website "Thastiot" claimed that during Vladimir Putin's much publicized visit to Israel, Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to form a junior company to Gazprom – the Russian oil and gas giant—which would help develop Israel's biggest gas field, the recently discovered reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, the so-called "Levyatan" (Leviathan) reserves.
"Eventually Israeli gas will be exported to the far east," Ohad Marani, CEO of IDLC energy which is already drilling the Myra, said to me. For him, the question is purely economic. "In the Far East we will see three times what we see in Europe. While we won't be able to keep the whole margin, it's surely better than any European option, which would involve an expensive pipe."
The senior industry veteran with whom I spoke is not quite sure. Yes, the Far East has unlimited demand ("The Japanese are lessening their reliance on nuclear, and the Chinese can never have enough") but the European market remains relevant and we have this massive amount of gas already discovered or to be discovered. The US geological survey (USGC) estimates that gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean amount to 345 trillion cubic feet while Russian gas reserves in Siberia are estimated at 643 tcf.
Big business! With lots of Russians having come and gone to Israel on this question, one wonders about the relationship between the gas deal and Russian involvement on the Iran question.
The same week Putin visited Netanyahu in Jerusalem, Eurasia monitor published that:
"the government agency that oversees Russia's arms exports and imports… confirmed that Iran is suing Russia for damages to the tune of some $4 billion in the Court of Arbitration in Geneva for cancelling in 2010 a contract to sell five divisions of the S-300 long-range antiaircraft missile system worth an estimated $800 million to $1 billion."
By some estimates the worth of the Levayatan gas-field might be 15 billion dollars say Gilad Alper, the gas industry analyst at the Excellence Investment house. It trades today at a price of 3 billion dollars.
Another way to look at it: Levayatan contains 473 billion cubic meters of gas. Gazprom exported 150 billion cubic meters of Gas to Europe in 2011, at a price of 384$ per thousand cubic meters – revenue of 57.6 billion dollar—this year Gazprom raised the price to 415$, an 8% increase that will generate another 4.6 billion dollar of revenue to Gazprom. What would be the cost of keeping Israeli competition neutralized? Would it be worth the cancellation of an 800 million dollar deal? Could Russian action over the missile sale and Israeli gas reserves indicate that they have come to terms with the Israeli point of view?
Prominent Americans like David Petraeus have been saying non-stop that Israel does not have the capability to destroy Iranian Nuclear capacities, and surely not Iran's ambition to go nuclear. But if Israel can indeed delay the project while in the meantime having taken out of the picture one of Iran's most important allies, then things might look very different from the office of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Everyone knows that Russia intends to play the 'spoiler' in the International arena. But this spoiler frequently has a price tag.
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