31 July 2014
Nicholas P. Roberts
Source: Middle East Monitor
In his book
Islams and Modernities, renowned historian of
religion Aziz Al-Azmeh argued that there are as many "Islams" as there
are situations that sustain them. In the context of the contemporary
Middle East, Azmeh's observation is readily apparent.
While definitive studies
have demonstrated that the majority of the world's Muslims share the
same desires and ideals as Americans and other Westerners, there are
certain individuals who claim that "Western" and "Islamic" ideals (if
such labels can even be applied appropriately) are antithetical. To be
certain, such claims are made frequently
by non-Muslim Westerners. In the Islamic context, such ideology is
represented today most prominently by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader
of the Al-Qaeda offshoot "the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (ISIS).
Demonstrating his ultimate goal, on June 29, Baghdadi rebranded his group
as the "Islamic State" (IS). Since well before their June declaration,
however, Baghdadi and his troops had been making nearly unchallenged
progress toward becoming just that: a state.
A recent article in the
New York Times
described the recent gains made by Baghdadi. "What I see in Raqqa
proves that the Islamic State has a clear vision to establish a state in
the real meaning of the word," the
Times article quoted a resident of the city of Raqqa as saying. "It is not a joke."
It certainly is
not a joke that Baghdadi is making concerted efforts to form a functioning state. However, it
is
a joke to describe this burgeoning state as "Islamic." To do so
demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of Islamic history and law, and
Baghdadi's proclamations and actions are indicative of his historical,
religious and cultural illiteracy. As the eminent Islamic scholar
Ebrahim Moosa has
argued repeatedly, this lack of "Islamic literacy" is the primary cause of extremism in the Middle East.
Baghdadi's ideology, rooted in the concept of
takfir, calls for transnational jihad to establish a new "Islamic caliphate."
Takfiri
ideology holds that any Muslim whose beliefs are different is an
unbeliever and apostate and must, therefore, be killed. The concept of
takfir in Islamic law is complex.
Takfir
refers to declarations of apostasy and excommunication from the faith.
It is forbidden, considered heresy, for one Muslim to simply declare
another Muslim an apostate because of differences of opinion over the
faith. The process of
takfir, which usually only occurs after a
Muslim has declared himself a kafir, or unbeliever, is guarded by a
labyrinth of stringent legal measures.
Many Westerners
argue that Muslim leaders throughout the world are, to some degree, at
fault for the proliferation of this ideology because they have failed to
condemn it. However, this argument is superficial and does not pass the
test of any serious analysis. For only one example, the 2005
Amman Message,
the consensus of more than 500 Islamic scholars, including the Shaykh
of Al-Azhar, the Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Sistani, and Shaykh Yusuf
Al-Qaradawi, reminded Muslims that it is forbidden to declare a fellow
Muslim an apostate.
Instead of the superficial Western argument, this ideology has been
sustained and fed by very real factors, many of which have been created
and/or made worse by United States policy and actions in the Middle
East. For example, Baghdadi's group traces its origins to Iraq, where he
used the destruction from the 2003 American invasion to give his
ideology some legitimacy. Baghdadi argued that only Islam, as a total
and complete way of life governing matters of state and matters of
faith, could repel the American occupiers and begin to build a more
pristine "Islamic" way of life.
Takfiri militants like Baghdadi attempt to legitimate their
theoretical conceptualisation of an "Islamic State" as a return to the
past; a return to some point in history when a purer, richer form of
Islam was practiced. The example drawn upon is the experience of Prophet
Muhammad at Madinah. While the Prophet's community there was not a
"state," properly considered, it was the first instance of Islam being
used politically, and the example of the Prophet as a religious and
political leader remains the eternal model for all practicing Muslims to
adhere by. However, an analysis of the actual historical experience of
the Prophet and his followers at Madinah illuminates the religious and
historical illiteracy of
takfiri ideology.
First, the Qur'an expressly forbids declarations of apostasy between
Muslims. "Oh, you who believe and live on the path of God, be
discerning, and do not say to anyone who greets you with peace, 'You are
not a believer'" [4:94]. The Qur'an also reveals that there shall be no
compulsion in acceptance of religion [2:256]. Elsewhere, the Qur'an
reveals that there will naturally be differences of opinion among
Muslims and non-Muslims: "Say: 'Oh, you who disbelieve, I do not worship
what you worship, and you do not worship what I worship, and I shall
not worship what you worship, and you shall not worship what I worship.
To you your religion, and to me, mine'" [109:1-6].
The Islamic State's demands
that Iraqi Christians leave their territory, convert to Islam or face
immediate death have no basis in either the Qur'an or the example of the
Prophet. When the Prophet arrived in Madinah to establish the first
Muslim community, the most powerful tribes there were Jewish. Especially
after being harshly oppressed in Makkah before he fled to Madinah, the
Prophet sought to establish a system of government that was based on the
voluntary consent of the people, and that guaranteed them the freedom
to worship and practice their faiths as they wished.
One of the first Muslim historians, Muhammad ibn 'Umar al-Waqidi,
provided an illuminating account of this. He wrote that the inhabitants
of Madinah "were a mixed lot" and, therefore, the Prophet "wished, when
he arrived at Madinah, to establish peace/concord between them, all of
them as a collective group, and to make peace with them. A man would be a
Muslim and his father a polytheist."
1
The political system that Muhammad ultimately established is
enshrined in what has been labelled the "Constitution of Madinah."
Though not strictly speaking a constitution, this collection of eight
separate documents established a governing system of political and
religious tolerance. The first document was written after a contract
between Muhammad and the Madinan tribes known in English as the Treaty
or Contract of Al-'Aqaba. The early Muslim historians Ibn Ishaq and Ibn
Hashim recorded Muhammad as having stated upon the conclusion of the
treaty: "All things are now common between us; your blood is as my
blood, your ruin is as my ruin."
2
Ibn Ishaq, who wrote the first biography of the Prophet, described
the "Constitution" as such: "The apostle [Muhammad] wrote a document
concerning the emigrants and the helpers [the peoples of Madinah] in
which he made a friendly agreement with the Jews and established them in
their religion and their property, and stated the reciprocal
obligations."
3 The Constitution lists each tribe in Madinah
one by one, and guarantees their rights and freedoms. Based on these
documents as well as the written historical record, the Islamic
city-state at Madinah was characterised by unprecedented political and
religious tolerance, as guaranteed by law.
The example of the Prophet and the political model of his city-state
at Madinah thus stands in stark contrast to Baghdadi's (non) "Islamic
State." Muhammad guaranteed freedom of religion and worship in a set of
written laws; conversely, Baghdadi and his troops are burning ancient
Christian churches in Mosul and recently destroyed the ancient
Shrine of Jonah.
By destroying the shrine of Prophet Jonah simply because he is
associated with Christianity Baghdadi is, apparently, unaware that the
Qur'an commands Muslims to revere all of the prophets who preached
monotheism as prophets of Islam (submission to the Will of God) and to
make no distinction between them. For example, the Qur'an commands
Muhammad to acknowledge that his religion is the religion of Abraham,
who worshipped no god but God (monotheism). "So, believers, say, 'We
believe in God and in what was sent down to us and what was sent down to
Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and what was given to
Moses, Jesus, and all the prophets by their Lord. We make no distinction
between any of them, and we devote ourselves to Him'" [2:136].
Tolerance and pluralism in Muhammad's city-state at Madinah also
characterised relations between men and women. Baghdadi and his fellow
takfiris should remember that the Qur'anic revelations regarding affairs between men and women were
revolutionary
in the context of life in the seventh century, not just in the Arabian
peninsula, but anywhere at that point in time throughout the world.
Consider, for example, the reports that IS fighters are
forcing young women
from conquered territories into marriage. If these reports are true,
Baghdadi should know that his fighters are directly disobeying the
Qur'anic injunction that forbids such acts: "You who believe, it is not
lawful for you to inherit women against their will" [4:19]. Baghdadi
should remember that the Qur'an granted women rights to inheritance,
which was unprecedented in monotheism (and most of history). As the
Qur'an reveals: "Men shall have a share in what their parents and
relatives leave, and women shall have a share in what their parents and
relatives leave, whether that legacy is small or large, this is
commanded by God" [4:7].
The authority which Baghdadi believes he possesses to issue such
decrees, namely, Caliph of all Sunni Muslims, is illegitimate in terms
of Islamic law and historical practice. Many of the most
prominent Islamic scholars today have condemned Baghdadi's declaration as such.
The system of the Islamic caliphate is a complex concept in Islamic
history. It was conceived in the days immediately following Muhammad's
death, which was a particularly tumultuous time for the Muslim
community. During Muhammad's lifetime, he was, as the final Messenger of
God, believed to be the indisputable leader of the faith. As such, he
relayed revelations from God to the Muslim community to guide them
throughout their lives. If Muslims had questions about certain things
that were not covered by God's revelations, they looked to Muhammad for
guidance. These examples eventually came to be one of the sources of law
in Islam, known collectively as the
sunnah, the sayings and way of life of the Prophet, made up of individual hadith, or examples.
Neither the Qur'an nor the
sunnah contained instructions for
Muslims regarding what to do politically after Muhammad's death. The
community was left without a leader and no Divine Guidance on how to
select one. Accordingly, the Prophet's closest companions met and drew
upon the long-refined Arab traditions of shura (consultation),
ijma'a (consensus) and
bay'ah
(voluntary oath of allegiance) in establishing a system for selecting
political leaders. This new system, the Caliphate, was established the
day after Muhammad's death, when one of his most trusted companions,
Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa, known more simply as Abu Bakr, received the
voluntary consent of the Madinan community to serve as
Khalifat Rasul Allah, or the successor to the Messenger of God.
Ibn Ishaq wrote perhaps the first historical description of this
process. The acceptance of Abu Bakr as the successor to Muhammad was "an
unpremeditated affair," he wrote, reflecting the lack of instructions
from God or the Prophet on what to do after his death. Ibn Ishaq
continued to write that Abu Bakr was chosen voluntarily because the
community held him in the highest esteem. He then wrote, "He who accepts
a man as ruler without consulting the Muslims, such acceptance has no
validity for either of them."
4
Abu Bakr's first speech (
khutba) as caliph demonstrates the
respect with which Muhammad's closest companions and the first Muslims
regarded concepts such as consultation, consensus and accountability.
Ibn Ishaq recorded Abu Bakr as stating: "I have been given authority
over you but I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me, and if I
do ill, then put me right. Truth consists in loyalty and falsehood in
treachery... Obey me so long as I obey God and His apostle, and if I
disobey them, you owe me no obedience."
5
Granted, throughout history the caliphate did diverge from this
original model. Understanding the model of the Prophet and his
companions is, nonetheless, of ultimate importance today because all
believing Muslims consider it to be the ideal model of human endeavour.
This remains especially true for those Muslims, such as Baghdadi, who
describe themselves as adhering to the
salafi school of thought.
Salafism is a complex and broad label that describes many different contemporary ideologies. However, it draws its name from
al-salaf al-salih,
which means the righteous or pious predecessors. The label refers to
Muhammad, his companions (the Rashidun) and the first community of
Muslims at Madinah. Though all Muslims look to the example of this
generation for supreme human guidance, this is especially true for
figures like Baghdadi, who often portray themselves as the purest
representatives of this historical model.
Within this context, then, it is clear that Baghdadi is Islamically
illiterate. The challenge of this Islamically illiterate ideology
extends far beyond the relatively more simple matter of terrorism. An
ideology, after all, cannot be defeated by counterterrorism. Therefore,
the international community, if it is interested in defeating Baghdadi,
must realise that this ideology was not created in a vacuum. Rather, it
is sustained by a confluence of factors, such as poor quality of
education, corruption and despotic governance. The challenge of Islamic
illiteracy is not killing its ideologues; the challenge is killing the
forces that sustain the ideology itself.
One of the most negative consequences of the proliferation of this
ideology is that, unfortunately, it augments the Western perception that
all Islamic activists are violent, intolerant and autocratic. It must
be clear that this is not true. The Tunisian Islamic activist Rachid
Ghannouchi, for example, frames his political, social and cultural
reformist vision within a conceptual framework subsumed by Islam. He
even calls for the establishment of an "Islamic state." However,
Ghannouchi's "Islamic state" is in no way similar to Baghdadi's.
In terms of United States government policy, officials must not let the proliferation of
takfiri
ideology cloud their understanding of Islam and politics. Religion is,
always has been and will remain an important factor in socio-political
reform and democratic mobilisation in all societies throughout the
world. For the United States government to view Baghdadi through a lens
focused solely on counterterrorism, and for the United States government
to allow a fear of
takfiri ideology to preclude them from
accepting and assisting peaceful Islamic activists like Rachid
Ghannouchi or even the Muslim Brotherhood, is myopic, short sighted and
superficial. Until the factors sustaining this particular interpretation
of Islam are addressed, it will, despite its illiteracy, continue to
spread.
1Muhammad ibn 'Umar al-Waqidi, Kitab al-maghazi, ed.
Marsden Jones, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 184. As
cited in R.B. Serjeant, "The 'Sunnah Jami'ah," Pacts with the Yathrib
Jews, and the 'Tahrim' of Yathrib: Analysis and Translation of the
Documents Comprised in the So-Called 'Constitution of Madinah," Bulletin
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,
Vol. 41, No. 1 (1978).
2As cited in Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, vol. 5 (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd.,
1911), 380-381. See also A. Guillaume, trans., Ibn Hashim, ed., The Life
of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (London: Oxford
University Press, 1955), 201-207.
3Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, 222.
4Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, 684-685.
5Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, 687.
Mr. Roberts studies Islamic intellectual history and
Islamic movements with Dr. John Voll at Georgetown University in the
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. He
recently completed writing Political Islam and the Invention of
Tradition, soon to be published, which explores the emergence of
Political Islam and the concept of an Islamic state founded upon an
indigenously Islamic concept of social contract. He has lived and
studied in Tunisia and Yemen. Prior to his appointment at Georgetown, he
was Special Assistant to the former Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Department of State and worked in the private sector.
